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Abstract: This article takes up the specific example of Poulo Condor (the Con Dao 
archipelago in Vietnam) as colonial prison island in order to examine this persistence of 
colonial island imaginaries built around the imagined project of the prison island well into the 
middle of the 20th century. Such imaginaries appear to run counter to dominant political 
discourse of the period along with ongoing media campaigns calling for the end to penal 
transportation and overseas penal colonies. This article contends that closer attention needs to 
be paid to the disjuncts and gaps between the official discourse of the French colonial 
authorities located in France and the enactment of such discourse in the colonies themselves. 
The central focus of the article is a close analysis of correspondence between colonial officials 
stationed in French Indochina from 1925 onwards; these documents will be contextualised 
with reference to the longer histories of both the Con Dao archipelago and France’s use of 
prison islands. An understanding of Poulo Condor as a complex extralegal space will be 
framed by Ann Laura Stoler’s concept of the ‘colony’ as it develops Giorgio Agamben’s notion 
of the ‘state of exception’ and Michel Foucault’s concept of ‘security’. What emerges is an 
ongoing colonial pathology which continues to fixate on the prison island as a key colonial 
stake even after such a stake has become increasing untenable. 
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If we want to maintain a penal colony [bagne] on POULO CONDOR there is only 
one solution which is to turn it into the penal colony of the Union Française […] 
This would be as utopian as it would be apolitical. (Michel, 1948) [Unless otherwise 
stated all translations from the original French are the author’s own] 
 
The above statement appeared in a note addressed to the High Commissioner of Indochina, 
Emile Bollaert, from his political advisor Didier Michel, dated 18 February 1948. It forms 
part of an ongoing discussion between the High Commissioners (first Bollaert and then Léon 
Pignon) and their advisors about the future of the French colonial prison island Poulo Condor 
(Con Dao) located 200 km off the southern coast of Cochinchine. The statement is 
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particularly telling in its articulation of a continued colonial investment in the island qua penal 
colony at a point when France had not only been obliged to acknowledge its shifting, reduced 
role in Indochina but was also in the final stages of closing its largest penal colony in French 
Guiana, having ceased convict transportation in 1938. The use of the term ‘utopian’ is unusual 
at this point not least as it is usually associated with much earlier visions of the larger penal 
colonies in French Guiana and New Caledonia modelled on the perceived successes in 
Australia (Forster, 1996). 
Similarly, to define such a project as ‘apolitical’ seems especially odd in the context of 
a prison island used to house those convicted of anti-colonial (and later, communist) activities 
alongside common-law criminals. Michel’s comment might easily be dismissed as throwaway 
and misjudged. However, when read in the context of the wider correspondence from this 
period, it becomes clear that during the final years of French colonial occupation in Vietnam, 
the small Poulo Condor archipelago, of which Grande-Condore (Côn Sơn) is the largest 
island, played a key role in maintaining colonial fantasies, themselves predicated on the 
concept of the prison island as penal colony. 
Drawing on archival documents now housed in the Archives Nationales d’Outre Mer 
in Aix-en-Provence, this article considers this specific geopolitical role played by Poulo 
Condor during the late 1940s. The island was used as a French colonial prison from 1862 
onwards and became notorious for its particularly harsh conditions which, at various points, 
included the use of torture and infamous French penal technologies such as the ‘barre de justice’ 
(a long metal bar to which prisoners would have one or both legs shackled), an export from 
the old dockyard prisons (Pierre, 2017). Over 20,000 prisoners are thought to have died on 
Poulo Condor over the course of its operation (Nguyễn, 2012). This is an extraordinary total 
given the island only housed an average of about 2,000 prisoners (only increasing to 10,000 
during the American War) at any given time. The irony whereby Con Dao became a key 
site of political education, producing some of Vietnam’s most renowned political leaders, 
including its second President, Ton Duc Thang, who spent 15 years imprisoned there, has 
been well noted by scholars (Goscha, 2011; Marr, 2013; Zinoman, 2001). 
The present article takes up the specific example of Poulo Condor as colonial prison 
island in order to examine this persistence of colonial fantasies built around the imagined 
project of the prison island well into the middle of the 20th century. I adopt the term ‘fantasy’ 
here alongside ‘pathology’ as context-specific forms of what Kothari and Wilkinson (2010) 
have termed ‘colonial island imaginaries’, drawing on Edward Said’s broader notion of 
‘colonial imaginaries’. These imaginaries refer to the projection and construction of multiple 
aspects of island life, landscape, resources, location, landscape, and so on as befit various 
colonial projects. Such imaginaries, while often relying heavily on myths and binaries, are 
nevertheless multi-faceted and subsequently open to reconfiguration by different populations 
and groups over the course of time and, indeed, decolonisation. Conversely, the fantasy of 
the prison island that this article seeks to unpack is based on a particular refusal to accept the 
colonial project as winding down and a conception of island space that reflects the heavy (yet 
grossly underfunded) use of incarceration throughout French colonial occupation of 
Indochina (Zinoman, 2001, p. 63). 
Such fantasies might appear to run counter to dominant political discourse of the period 
along with ongoing media campaigns calling for the end to penal transportation and overseas 
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penal colonies. What this article contends is that closer attention needs to be paid to the 
disjuncts and gaps between the official discourse of the French colonial authorities located in 
France and the understanding, negotiation, and enactment of such discourse in the colonies 
themselves. Rather than consider such gaps as anomalies or the result of individual acts of 
interpretation, we might instead posit that it is precisely these gaps or elisions that define the 
colonial operation in its essence. This approach echoes Roscoe’s (2018, p. 63) call to attend 
to the “view from the colonies” which she explores in relation to the use of carceral islands 
off the coast of Australia both during and after the cessation of convict transportation from 
Britain to the mainland. 
The transitional moment from French colonial occupation to withdrawal might also be 
compared with that identified by Sherman (2009) in her analysis of the changing role and 
status of the penal settlement located on the Andaman Islands between 1921 and 1940. Indeed, 
as shall be noted later, the Andaman Islands were held up by French colonial authorities as a key 
example of ongoing use of penal colonies by the British. Sherman’s discussion of the shift to 
voluntary transportation following WWI emphasizes tensions between the dual colonial 
ambitions of discipline and development along with those of central and provincial 
government. What is absent from the archives that form the basis of my analysis is any 
aspiration towards the development of Poulo Condor beyond its function as penal colony.  
This article will begin by setting out a brief history of the archipelago and, in particular, 
the various appellations by which it has been known. We will also identify the presentation 
of Poulo Condor within the French colonial imaginary as both a ‘tabula rasa’ and a space that 
has always operated as a site of exile and imprisonment. The article then goes on to explore the 
‘exceptional space’ of the prison island via Ann Laura Stoler’s (2012, 2016) reading of Michel 
Foucault and Giorgio Agamben, focusing in particular on Foucault’s (2009) oft-overlooked 
notion of ‘security’. This is intended to create a helpful theoretical framework within which 
to consider in detail some of the correspondence between colonial authorities based in 
Indochina towards the end of French colonial occupation concerning an imagined future for 
Poulo Condor. By way of conclusion, the article offers a snapshot of the archipelago today as 
both a space of collective memory and of luxury resort tourism. The vestiges of the French 
colonial prison buildings are considered alongside the more recent American camps in order 
to draw out the carceral and colonial continuities that play out in the space of the island. 
While the specific, complex political events taking place in Indochina during the 1940s 
and 1950s determine to a large extent the use of the prison island in the detention of so-called 
“political prisoners”, this article also looks at the longer term political imaginary of the prison 
island and specifically its definition as bagne, the shorthand term adopted by the French to 
refer to its penal colonies. The correspondence between High Commissioners of the period, 
Bollaert then Pignon, and their advisors, provides clear evidence not simply of the strategic 
geographical position of Poulo Condor but of ongoing colonial ideals around the role and 
significance of the prison island. Where the arrival of the U.S. forces in the 1950s and the 
subsequent full withdrawal of the French made such colonial fantasies untenable, the 
persistence of these up until that moment merits attention. 
Secondly, in considering the language used to describe the geopolitical function of the 
island in this correspondence, this might be mapped back onto a wider context in which France’s 
main penal colony in French Guiana was in the process of closing. While there is potential 
for further analysis of Poulo Condor as archipelago in relation to France’s other main overseas 
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penal colony in New Caledonia, this is beyond the scope of the present article. The penal 
colony in New Caledonia stopped receiving convicts in 1896 and ceased operation in 1924 
(Barbançon, 2003). Furthermore, despite its island geography, New Caledonia bears little 
resemblance to Poulo Condor in terms of size, topography, or climate. Indeed, Poulo Condor 
(76 km²) is closer in size to L’Île des Pins (152.3 km²), located 150km to the east of the New 
Caledonia mainland and once used as a prison island for both communards and Kabyle rebels. 
Where on the one hand, the divergence in discourse around the two bagnes 
demonstrates a disjunct between Paris and its colonies, it also suggests we consider more 
carefully the reasons why the bagne was closed in French Guiana, looking beyond the usual 
humanitarian arguments to consider the highly racialised stakes of transportation. In turn, this 
provides useful pause for reflection on the persistent use of extra-territorial islands (Horn, 
2019; Loyd & Mountz, 2018; Ratuva, 2019) as sites of imprisonment, internment, and 
detention today, alongside the difficult political task of decarceration (Fuggle, 2019; Heiner, 
2015; Kennedy, 2014) within contemporary contexts. 
In juxtaposing the wider history of the bagne with the specific story of Poulo Condor 
at the end of French colonial occupation of Indochina, previously imperceptible gaps in 
existing scholarship appear. Both Morlat’s (1990) work on colonial repression and Zinoman’s 
(2001) extensive study of French colonial prisons in Vietnam conclude in the early 1940s and, 
as such, do not consider the complex transition from French to American occupation. Where 
Zinoman’s epilogue (2001, p. 302) includes a throwaway indictment of the re-education 
camps, any mention, for example, of the French use of tiger cages and their American equivalent 
is glaringly absent. Similarly, Zeller’s (2019) recent account of the Japanese occupation of 
1945 dedicates a chapter to the “tiger cages” used to imprison French and Vietnamese 
subjects. Not only does Zeller (2019, p. 167) fail to acknowledge the use of the same methods 
by the French colonial authorities which pre-existed the Japanese occupation, he emphasizes 
the concept of “caging” prisoners as symbolising a system put in place by the Kenpeitai. 
Finally, Angleviel’s (2020) recent study dedicated to Poulo Condor considers the American 
use of the archipelago but overlooks the archives from the 1940s discussed in this article. 
Considering the wider context of France’s use of convict transportation, Donet-
Vincent’s (1992) account of the end of the penal colony in French Guiana lays much of its 
emphasis on the work of Charles Péan and the Salvation Army rather than the wider 
geopolitics of transportation. Her approach is to define the closure in terms of Péan’s 
painstaking humanitarian work in the colony which she offsets against Albert Londres’ (1924) 
investigative journalism originally published in Le Petit Parisien. As such, the closure of the 
penal colony is recounted as a story involving different types of social actor. Moreover, while 
Donet-Vincent documents the debates around the penal colony and its proposed closure in 
metropolitan France during the 1920s and 1930s, less focus is given to the ongoing role of 
colonial prisons elsewhere, including Indochina. Recently, former French Minister of Justice 
– and outspoken critic of both the death penalty and France’s prison system – Robert Badinter 
(2017, para. 2) has called for more attention to be given to the operation of the bagne during 
Vichy, which he describes as “a veritable hecatomb” and a crime against humanity (on the 
impact of the Vichy regime in French Indochina see also Jennings, 2001). Further comparison 
between the Nazi regime and the forest work camps in French Guiana, notably Charvein, 
has been made by Cornuel (2003). Yet, despite calls for greater accountability and 
acknowledgement of the atrocities associated with penal transportation as a global 
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phenomenon (Anderson, 2018), little has so far been done to incorporate other French 
colonial prisons during the post-WWII period into this analysis.  
 
A short history of Con Dao 
 
To start to understand the complex political imaginary of Con Dao, it is useful to look briefly 
at its various appellations. As Nash (2016) argues, the role of place-naming is key to grasping 
the geopolitical stakes of an island or archipelago. The different names used to refer to Con 
Dao and their respective etymologies not only emphasise the multiple claims made on its 
space throughout history but also suggest the impossibility of easy, fixed definitions of the 
archipelago. The geopolitical value of Con Dao as a strategic point for explorers throughout 
history can be traced via clear references to the archipelago from Marco Polo in the 13th 
Century onward (Polo, 2016/c.1300, Book 3, Chapter 8). It is also possible that even earlier 
references can be found in Ptolemy’s Geography where a group of three islands are 
mythologized as the Isles of the Satyrs. In his 1764 Origin of Commerce, Adam Anderson’s 
location of the islands referred to by Ptolemy are more precisely situated in relation to Malacca 
as part of a critique of Ptolemy’s erroneous and fanciful map-making attempts: 
 
And, to demonstrate how little they knew either eastward or north-eastward of the 
Aurea Chersonesus, i.e. probably the promontory of Malacca, Ptolemy has placed 
thereabouts the three fabulous Isles of the Satyrs, wherein they supposed the 
inhabitants to have tails like beasts; and that ships having any iron nails fastened in 
them were stopped in the neighbouring seas of those isles, and could not proceed, 
on account of the rocks of loadstone or magnet at the bottom of the sea. (Anderson, 
1764, p. lxxvi) 
 
There is little historical consensus on the number of islands making up the archipelago, 
with the total suggested ranging from the three referenced by Ptolemy all the way up to the 
current official list of 16, consisting of the following: Côn Sơn (previously Grande-Condore), 
Hòn Bà (Petite-Condore), Phú Hòa, Phú Lệ, Phú Phong, Phú Vinh, Phú Nghĩa, Phú Thọ, 
Phú Bình, Phú An, Phú Hưng, Phú Thịnh, Phú Hòa, Phú Hội, Trứng Lớn, and Trứng 
Nhỏ. A 1953 report by the French colonial authorities entitled FICHE sur les possibilités de 
l’utilisation de l’archipel de POULO CONDORE suggested there were only 10 islands 
(Commissariat Général de France en Indochine, 1953). While all the islands have multiple 
names, many of the smaller islands are little bigger than large rocks with surface areas of less 
than 100 m2.  
‘Pulo Condore’ was the name given to the archipelago by the British East India 
Company, who set up a short-lived and fateful garrison on Con Son Island between 1702 
and 1705 (Wong, 2012). The word ‘pulo’ is a variation of the Malay pulau, meaning ‘island’. 
‘Condore’, with its multiple spellings, is said to refer to the largest island’s gourd-like shape. 
The story of the brief British occupation is recounted not without a certain relish by 
Demariaux (1956) as part of his reportages on the islands in the 1930s published in La Depêche 
Indochine. His account of the failure of the British to successfully develop long-term strategic 
use of the islands, despite clear intention to do so, is no doubt intended to lay emphasis upon 
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the importance and effectiveness of the French colonial occupation of the island beyond its 
use as a prison. However, as we will argue, one of the difficulties faced by the French by the 
end of their colonial occupation was imagining the island as anything other than a prison. 
Another possibility is that the island’s name evolved from the mythical Chinese place 
known as Kunlun (on conceptions of islands in Ancient and Imperial China, see Luo & 
Grydehøj, 2017). Kunlun Shan means ‘mountain range’ in Mandarin, and it is likely that Con 
Dao’s mountainous terrain inspired the appellation “Kunlun Shan Islands” marked on the 
17th century Mao Kun navigation map compiled in 1628 by Mao Yuanyi which is now 
housed in the U.S. Library of Congress.⁠ Penitentiary director Jean Brulé (1947), in his short 
book on the island, suggests a variation of the transliteration of the Chinese K’Ouen Louen, 
subsequently transformed into Con Non by the Annamites, meaning ‘island of snakes’.  
Variations on Condore (Condor, Kondor, Condur, Sondur) have existed at least since 
Polo’s visit in 1292 but, from the end of the 19th century onwards, the name became inextricably 
associated with French colonial occupation. The French version, ‘Poulo-Condore’, functioned 
(and continues to do so) as a metonym for the prison established in 1861. The French would 
also refer to the islands collectively as ‘Les Condores’ and sometimes the largest island Con Son 
becomes ‘Grande Condore’, with Hòn Bà, the largest of the smaller islands located South West 
of Con Son, known as ‘Petite Condore’. A travel memoir dating from 1723 (Mémoire sur l’isle 
de Poulo Condor surnommée isle d’Orléans en Chine, 1723) suggests an earlier attempt to rename 
the largest island “Isle d’Orléans en Chine” but this does not seem to have taken hold, indicating 
perhaps the persistence of the archipelago’s existing appellations amongst the different 
populations in the region. ⁠ French occupation of the islands dates from the treaty of 28 
November 1787, which is reaffirmed by a subsequent treaty dated 5 June 1862. As will be 
discussed further, it is toward these documents that the colonial authorities in Indochina turn 
during the late 1940s in order to assert a colonial presence on Poulo Condor which exists 
independently to the wider French colonial occupation of Indochina (Wintrebert, 1948). 
It is not clear exactly when the shift from the French ‘Poulo-Condore’ to the 
Vietnamese ‘Con Son’ took place, but it is likely to have occurred in the mid- to late-1950s 
during the French withdrawal from Indochina. CIA bulletins dating from the mid-1960s 
indicate the archipelago on their maps of Vietnam as “Con Son” with “Poulo-Condore” 
marked in brackets (Central Intelligence Agency, 1965) and, by the 1970s, the island is 
unequivocally referred to as Con Son (Department of State, 1970). Consequently, today it 
seems that to evoke Con Son, even when referring specifically to the largest island in the 
archipelago, is to make allusion to the horrors of the American War in the same way that to 
speak of Poulo-Condore constitutes a direct reference to the French prison once located on 
the island. As a consequence, Con Dao seems to have become the preferred term for talking 
about the island(s) in the present tense in both tourist literature (Lonely Planet, 2018) and 
general conversation in Vietnam. 
Zinoman (2001, pp. 16-17) has suggested that the architecture, management, and 
general “ill-discipline” of Indochina’s colonial prisons emerged from a number of factors 
which included lack of economic investment and a refusal to consider colonial subjects in 
terms of European discourses of reform and rehabilitation. Yet, it is also worth noting the 
concept of the prison island as one which initially appeared off the French coastline as part of 
Vauban’s ceinture de fer (iron belt) fortifications around the French coastline between 1665 and 
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1707 (Fougère, 2002, pp. 36-38). The carceral uses of France’s islands document the shift 
over the centuries from a form of security directed outwards towards external threats to one 
facing inwards towards internal enemies. Most famous, perhaps, is the Île d’If, where the 
fictional Count of Monte Cristo was held along with real life communards. More recently, 
the disgraced Vichy leader Philippe Pétain was exiled to the Île d’Yeu after his death penalty 
was commuted due to old age. Between 1959 and 1961, future Algerian president Ahmed 
Ben Bella was imprisoned at Fort Liédot on Île d’Aix along with four other FLN (National 
Liberation Front) members. Since the 17th century, France’s coastal islands have also 
functioned as holding pens for those awaiting deportation and transportation. Convicts 
awaiting transportation to French Guiana were held in the Maison Centrale on Île de Ré, 
located off the Atlantic coast next to La Rochelle. The prison still operates today and houses 
those undergoing some of the longest sentences in France. 
The complex mythology of Poulo-Condore embodied in the etymology of its name is 
doubled by its role as ‘bagne’. How do we understand this term which is applied to Poulo 
Condor not merely as a nickname but as a designation – one that is clearly marked on the 
prison wall in a postcard dating from the early 20th century – and sets it apart from other 
forms of colonial prison such as the ‘maison centrales’ found in Saigon and Hanoi? The term 
bagne was most widely used in France to denote the dockyard prisons (bagnes portuaires) located 
in Brest, Toulon, and Rochefort during the 18th and 19th Centuries. The name was 
subsequently transferred to the newly established penal colonies in French Guiana and New 
Caledonia. The first convicts were transported to French Guiana in 1852, and the planning 
and opening of the penal colony in New Caledonia a decade later coincided roughly with 
the establishment of the penitentiary on Poulo Condor in 1861.  
While the name bagne is generally thought to have originated from the Italian word 
bagno in reference to the public baths located near the prison in Constantinople during the 
16th century where Spanish and Italian Christians were held captive, in his etymological 
enquiry into the origins of the term, Audisio (1957) has pointed out that the use of the term 
goes back much further to the Middle Ages. He suggests it was used to refer to the Mahomet 
slave prisons of the 15th century and earlier. He also suggests the term bagne in its evocation 
of ‘bain’ might be as much symbolic as denoting a specific proximity to public baths or any 
other body of water. While conceding this is speculative, it is interesting to note the idea of 
the bagne as a site of cleansing and, indeed, spiritual redemption – and this was, in fact, part 
of the rationale for creating the penal colonies in French Guiana and New Caledonia 
(Fougère, 2002, p. 130). Yet, such symbolism, however implicit, was largely at odds with the 
existing image of the dockyard prisons as sites of overcrowding, petty and organised crime, 
and general insalubrity from which the name was directly taken. As Fougère (2002, p. 130) 
points out, care was taken to distinguish the overseas ‘colonies pénales’ from the ‘bagnes 
portuaires’ (dockyard prisons), not least via a focus on the “agricultural myth” that emphasized 
redemption via working the land. 
Moreover, it is important to observe that where France’s main penal colonies assembled 
political deportees, transportees (those having committed serious and violent crimes), and 
relégués (repeat recidivists) from both the Metropole and its colonies, the utopian vision of the 
penal colony as a site of redemption was largely reserved for the white population transported 




The rhetoric of rehabilitation - and regeneration - was central to French prisoners 
being deported. Arguably this was merely rhetoric, but even as a rhetorical stance it 
differed from the version applied to Indochina, where no discourse of rehabilitation 
existed, just containment or extraction of labor, or both.   
 
Thus, the “bagne” on Poulo Condor should be understood as a site of exile which 
combined both forced labour and political deportation. It was also based on earlier practices 
including the exile of subjects from their home village and region. Where this occurred to 
fulfil labour requirements elsewhere, it not only enacted a rupture in terms of material, 
economic support, it also constituted a spiritual and symbolic form of severance as a result of 
the importance attached to homeland across Vietnamese culture and society (Paterson, 2016, 
pp. 222-223; Zinoman, 2001, pp. 17-18). 
According to Jean Brulé (1947), director of Poulo Condor during 1947 and 1948, many 
of the files and archives located on the island were destroyed when prisoners briefly took over 
the island during 1945-46. His own short text dedicated to the prison is heavily reliant on the 
journalist Jean-Claude Demariaux’s reportages which appeared in La Dépêche d’Indochine 
almost a decade earlier (Brulé, 1947; Demariaux, 1956). The aim of the present article is not 
to provide a full, in-depth account of Poulo Condor during its 113-year operation; Zinoman’s 
2001 study already offers an extensive account of the French colonial prison system in 
Vietnam up until 1940. Instead, the intention is to identify what might be considered a blind 
spot in other historical accounts. In his presentation of the “archives de la guerre” (archives of 
war) for the period between 1945 and 1947, Devillers (1988) takes the approach of allowing 
the public discourse and private correspondence to largely speak for itself. He concludes with 
the scathing indictment of all involved in what he terms the “civilizing and revolutionary 
myth,” (Devillers, 1988, pp. 376-7) arguing, in particular, that the bogus anti-communist 
stance assumed by the colonial administration could not fail to lead to U.S. intervention and 
the widespread violence that ensued. If his selection of material is focused on the grand 
narrative of the French Indochina war, our focus here is on the somewhat lesser known details 
of Poulo Condor as key geopolitical stake.  
Scholars looking at colonial prison islands (Roscoe, 2018) and other spaces of carceral 
exile such as the infamous Boven Digoel detention camp in the Dutch East Indies (Mrázek, 
2009; Shiraishi, 1996) have argued that these exceptional spaces need to be understood as 
actually representing microcosms or microgeographies of wider colonial occupation. In 
isolating textual fragments from the available archives for close reading, this article advocates 
for a form of textual practice that repositions the archipelago at the centre rather than the 
periphery of mid-20th century colonial debates. The absence of extensive archives and the 
fragmentation of those archives that do remain is telling in itself and feeds the mythology of 
Poulo Condor in the political imaginary of the 1940s and 1950s, during which time many of 
the reports emphasise a lack of prior information on the archipelago as a starting point or 
context for strategic reflections. A note accompanying the aforementioned 1953 report on 
the archipelago dated 26 October and sent by Lieutenant-Colonel Adrieu to the Secretary of 
State makes the following pronouncement: 
 
The documentation at our disposal in Indochina on Poulo-Condore is very limited. 
Very few documents have been found, a file produced following an inter-army 
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reconnaissance between 28 and 21 March 1949 has provided the basis for what 
follows. The Navy possess no monographs with the exception of a hydrographic 
analysis included as an annex. (Adrieu, 1953) 
 
Co-opting the geographical remoteness of the archipelago (Hayward & Tran, 2014), 
this perspective allows for a geopolitical reimagining of the island which simultaneously 
emphasizes the island’s long history as a site of imprisonment whilst presenting it in terms of 
a tabula rasa (Duschinsky, 2012) upon which colonial fantasies (or indeed, pathologies) might 
continue to be projected. In exploring the persistence of such fantasies, the present article 
develops existing work carried out by Éric Fougère (2002) on France’s wider history of prison 
islands and might be situated alongside more recent debates about the ongoing legacies of 
colonialism on island geographies (Amoamo, 2013; McMillan, 2019). 
 
State of exception 
 
While establishing sovereignty on an island seems straightforward due to its separation from 
larger bodies of land, as Benton (2009) has pointed out in relation to an earlier period of 
European colonial history, its management is often incredibly complex. Where an island is 
too small to form its own administrative domain, it must invariably be attached to one located 
on the mainland. Con Dao is today part of Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu province, located some 230 
km away. Where islands operate as penal settlements for multiple jurisdictions, there is the 
more complicated question of who pays for the housing and subsistence of its detainees. Such 
questions inevitably become more pronounced and more contentious during the transition 
from colonial government to independent rule. 
In exploring the shifting geopolitical stakes of Poulo Condor as bagne or colonial prison 
island at the specific point towards the end of France’s colonial occupation of Indochina, our 
approach draws on Stoler’s (2012) critique of the “postcolonial” and the writing of histories 
of “colonialism”. Stoler (2012, para. 6) identifies a tendency of political theory to focus on 
“colonisation” or “colonialism” without seeking to understand the complexity of the term 
“colony”: 
 
None of these points of entry [ways of saying what a colony is] broach the changing 
force fields in which the term “colony” has operated, nor the geo-political and 
historical breadth of the political visions embedded within it. Each assumes an 
essence rather than tracks its coordinates, ascribes rather than poses what a colony is, 
and what generates and makes up its multiple logics. Such starting points are poorly 
positioned to address a colony’s range of mutation. Not least, a foundational if 
shadowed feature is lost: namely, that the colony (the penal colony, the military 
colony, the settler colony, the 19th-Century agricultural colonies in France) is 
marked by the instability of both its morphology and the political mandates to which 
its architects and agents subscribe.  
 
It is these multiple logics that embody the bagne in Poulo Condor together with its shifting 
status in relation not simply to mainland France or Cochinchine but to other bagnes as well as 
other French colonies and, subsequently, overseas territories demanding convict labour from 
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Indochina. Moreover, in identifying the violence embedded in the decolonial process, it is 
also important to explore the way in which such violence is underpinned by colonial 
administrative processes. Such processes might be read generously as desperate attempts to 
cling onto colonial power via recourse to multiple, conflicting decrees and the legal 
entanglements to which these gave rise. A note addressed to the High Commissioner of 
Indochina dated May 1948 and signed “Brossard” concerning the future of Poulo Condor 
includes the thinking through of multiple options or projects for the island’s future (Brossard, 
1948). Here, the archipelago is described as a “gage territorial sur,” and we might identify a 
deliberate ambiguity in the choice of the term ‘gage’ which can mean bet or wager but can 
also mean token or forfeit. Assuming both meanings are implied, Brossard seems to be 
suggesting the islands are worth investing in (betting on) but also that France’s claim to the 
territory is a certainty since the archipelago was handed over to the French (forfeited) by 
Emperor Gia-Long in 1787 in exchange for military support. While we might now disagree 
as to the validity of treaties and decrees attesting to French sovereignty in overseas territories, 
in the mid-20th Century, referral to such documents in the face of anti-colonial opposition 
would have been considered by the French colonial administration as both an honest and 
legitimate affirmation of long-term property rights (Wintrebert, 1948). 
Alternatively, we might also read this use of bureaucracy as effective and deliberate in 
producing a political impasse, the only response to which was ultimately violent resistance. 
In other words, the only possibility for anti-colonial struggle in the face of the complex 
administrative web spun by French colonial occupation in Indochina was the seizing of power 
by force. In this respect, the South Vietnamese government could only ever defer to the 
bureaucratic structures and systems the French had left in place. Conversely, any direct 
opposition could be met with an extralegal response backed by both the colonial military and 
carceral infrastructures in place across Indochina. Following the reinstatement of French 
colonial authority of the penitentiary in 1947, an inevitable tension arose between the federal 
direction of the bagne (the director Jean Brulé reports to the High Commissioner) and the 
South Vietnamese government whose oversight of Cochinchine included Poulo Condor. 
The budget for the penitentiary came out of the government budget with costs related to 
prisoners from other parts of Indochina reimbursed. On 22 September 1946, the French 
Commissioner in Cochinchine, Jean Cedile, writes to Nguyễn Văn Thinh, President of the 
provisional government in Cochinchine, addressing this issue (Cedile,1946). The response 
from the President, dated 14 October 1946, is frosty and insists that the administration of the 
islands falls within the government’s jurisdiction (Nguyễn, 1946). Implicit in this request, 
which is subsequently ignored, is a refusal to recognise French sovereignty over the islands 
independent to their colonial occupation of the mainland. 
The case of Poulo Condor is doubly relevant in suggesting this strategy of bureaucratic 
impasse on the part of the colonial administration. In this sense, the dossier marked Problèmes 
politiques actuels de Poulo-Condore (Haut-Commissaire de France pour l’Indochine, 1946-1949), 
which contains correspondence from 1946-1949, identifies the archipelago not as a problem 
to be “solved”, despite this claim being made, but instead as a problem to be instrumentalised. 
This is evident throughout the archives dating from the period which include the suggestion 
made by the Minister of France’s overseas territories, quoted in a note circulated amongst 
colonial officials in September 1948 that the penitentiary might be reserved for those 
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sentenced for carrying out anti-colonial violence (Haut-Commissaire de France pour 
l’Indochine, 1948). An earlier letter sent from Buttin to the High Commissioner of Indochina 
in May 1948 acknowledges that any proposals made concerning the future of Poulo Condore 
would not be readily agreed upon by the South and Central Vietnamese governments or 
treated lightly by the press in Saigon (Buttin, 1948). Consequently, any proposed projects for 
the archipelago required carefully handling and emphasis on its exceptionality. If the desire 
to maintain sovereignty over Poulo Condor was the direct result of the archipelago’s natural 
resources and potential for development, this position would seem logical. However, the 
failure of the penal colony to sustain itself via agricultural production makes this possibility 
moot. Rather, the interest in islands consists in their operation as site of colonial repression. 
The complex legalities of the space lies not merely in their islandness and distance from the 
mainland but, more specifically, in the extralegal status of those imprisoned there. 
Poulo Condor has always constituted that which Agamben (1998, 2005) following 
Schmitt (2005/1922) has identified as a state of exception. According to Benton (2009, p. 
171), there are numerous elements of uncertainty that “tend to inscribe extrajudicial actions 
into the heart of systems of exile and convict transportation.” In the case of Poulo Condor, 
this exceptionality is, moreover, particularly impressive in its multi-directionality. As Stoler 
(2016, p. 116) points out: 
  
Colonies, like camps, are predicated not always on the making of “bare life” but on 
the arbitrary and quixotic shift in technologies that unevenly suspend rights, sustain 
privation, and diminish capacities for political life. But the suspension of rights is not 
the suspension of law. 
 
The law was not simply suspended to permit extralegal forms of punishment, deprivation, 
and, ultimately, torture and execution. At other points in Poulo Condor’s operation, the law 
was called upon as a means of redefining those involved in anti-colonial struggle as common 
criminals. Specific acts of violence or destruction of property were judged as criminal rather 
than political acts in order to facilitate transportation of Vietnamese convict labour to France’s 
other overseas colonies.  
Many of Indochina’s convicts transported to French Guiana in 1931 were transferred 
from Poulo Condor, where they had originally been classed as political prisoners. The transfer 
was intended in part to deal with overcrowding in French colonial prisons across the region, 
as well as to remove a sizeable portion of anti-colonial actors from Indochina. Back in 
October 1925, André Hesse, Minister of the Colonies, had written to the Governor of 
Indochina having been made aware that various colonial subjects (he does not say which 
colonies specifically) accused of political activities had been detained in regular prisons (maisons 
d’arrets and maisons de force) (Hesse, 1925). The minister emphasises the requirement to apply 
a different level of treatment to political prisoners than that applied to regular criminals, and 
this is clarified via a summary of the specific material conditions which includes larger cell 
space, greater freedom of movement, and better quality of food to regular prisoners, as well 
as choice of clothing and access to visitors. Hesse also emphasizes the need to budget 
appropriately for these considerations and to ensure common and political prisoners are kept 




What causes a prisoner to be considered as a “political prisoner” is evidently the 
nature of the infraction or crime for which he has been pursued. In France, during 
certain periods, certain crimes (carried out by anarchists, acts pertaining to the 
external security of the State, intelligence sharing with the enemy) have been 
considered too serious to grant the political prisoner a favourable regime. There are 
still, however, exceptions which can and have always been considered inevitable. 
The administrative authority conserves from this point of view within its purview a 
discretionary power of assessment. But we can affirm that the qualification of a crime 
or infraction as political should inspire a wide and generous understanding, when it 
relates to acts arising from passions engendered by electoral struggles. (Hesse, 1925) 
 
It is not difficult to envisage how this reference to potential exceptions provides license 
to revoke the special privileges of any and all potential political prisoners via any perceived 
threat such activity might make to internal and international security since surely, by its very 
definition, subversive political activity which results in arrest and detention is precisely that 
which poses a threat to existing national and international regimes. However, this exceptionalism 
is framed within a discourse that presents French colonial administration as open and liberal 
in its sentencing practices. Again, the irony whereby such instruction can be interpreted in 
terms of the global perspective offered by transportation between colonies is clear.  
At least 80 of those deported to French Guiana in 1931 had been involved in the Yen 
Bay mutiny of 1930. Since political deportees sent to French Guiana were usually exempt 
from labour according to the political decree of 1850, this status had to be revoked to ensure 
the maximum labour force possible. Anyone who had been arrested on suspicion of specific 
acts of violence or property damage was re-classed as a common criminal. This was not simply 
a sleight of hand but was written into legal codes (cited in Pagès, 1937). 
The state of exception reaches its apotheosis in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Where 
the implication of exceptional use is that it will be limited and carefully applied, what the 
20th century has taught us, if anything, is that the concept of the ‘exception’ offers up a catch-
all definition that simultaneously depoliticises certain forms of political protest whilst enacting 
a hyper-politicisation of others. When Michel (1948) refers to the bagne as “apolitique” 
(apolitical), this is perhaps what he is alluding to. Moreover, it assumes an evolution of the 
bagne from its original role (at least as defined by the Metropole) as a certain form of colonial 
institution which affirmed strict distinctions between political deportees and transported 
criminals. ‘Apolitical’ therefore describes not an absence of politics but the ability to suspend 
and redefine political and legal categories. Michel’s (1948) attribution of “utopian” is less 
clear, but we might read this in terms of a new vision that moved beyond old ideas of the 
bagne to a new phase in its evolution. Here, we might draw on Stoler’s (2012, 2016) analysis 
of the “colony” predicated on Michel Foucault’s (2009) notion of “security.” Although 
security is not a term Foucault appears to develop beyond his 1978 lectures, it provides the 
counterpoint in both scale and directionality to disciplinary modes of power. Where such 
modes target the individual body and seek to fix it within a certain organisation of space and 
time, security is predicated on mobility and growth. It is centrifugal rather than centripetal 
(see also Fougère, 2002, p. 159). Foucault (2009, pp. 17-18) describes the shifts in town 
planning which allowed for growth rather than sought to contain the city within clearly 
delineated walls and limits, citing projects for the redevelopment city of Nantes conceived 
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around the idea of flows. In contrast to discipline, security is focused on future potentialities 
rather than existing problems: 
  
Discipline works in an empty, artificial space that is to be completely constructed. 
Security will rely on a number of material givens. It will, of course, work on site 
with the flows of water, islands, air, and so forth. [Second], this given will not be 
reconstructed to arrive at a point of perfection, as in a disciplinary town. It is simply 
a matter of maximizing the positive elements, for which one provides the best 
possible circulation, and of minimizing what is risky and inconvenient, like theft and 
disease, while knowing that they will never completely be supressed. (Foucault, 
2009, p. 19) 
 
Where Agamben (2005), developing the concept beyond Foucault’s lecture series, has 
claimed that security is the dominant paradigm today, Stoler (2016, p. 77) considers security 
as embedded in colonial practice and administration from a much earlier date and key to 
understanding the colony and its operation: “The colony as a political concept is in part 
defined by its potentiality.” To speak of the prison island as “utopian” not only embodies 
earlier colonial desires constructed around the vision of the bagne. However, rather than 
locating the prison island within this vision as self-contained and centripetal in its organisation 
of convict bodies, Poulo Condor is instead imagined as a starting point for a de-centred and 
centrifugal form of colonial operation. 
 
The persistence of colonial pathologies 
 
It is in this context that we should read the correspondence between Jules Brévié, Governor 
of Indochina, and Pierre Pagès, Governor of Cochinchine on the question of Poulo Condor 
and the role of the bagne in 1937. As part of the lengthy report submitted by Pagès to Brévié 
on 22 March, the following observation is made as to the ongoing relevance of the penal colony: 
 
I note, here, the appropriateness of maintaining for the colonies - even as a transitory 
measure - the exile of convicts, in such a way that does not diminish the exemplary 
character which dictates its utilitarian and social role too often here for us to cease 
to recognise it. (Pagès, 1937) 
 
In this respect, Pagès continues, the bagne is seen as part of an ongoing “mission civilisatrice” 
(civilising mission) aimed at gradually replacing oriental values with Western ones: “Only a 
slow and careful adaptation will see Western conceptions eclipse those of the Orient.” To 
back this up, he cites the example of the Andamans, used by the British as a colonial prison 
for Indian subjects until 1932. This use of the colonial prison island long after transportation 
of British convicts ceased is presented as part of a successful long game played by the British 
which could be emulated with comparable success by the French not only in Indochina but 
via the location of other sites within the French Empire such as the Marquis Islands: 
 
It is towards a similar goal that we should be aiming. And I would like to propose, 
to that effect, that the Department undertake the relegation of convicted 
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Indochinoise to the valley of Vaithu and the Island of Noukahiva in the Marquis 
Islands, a region which is classed as one of the healthiest in the Tropics.  
Only a measure of this nature will provide relegation with a rational organisation. 
(Pagès, 1937) 
 
While such suggestions are dismissed by Brévié in his response which briefly explains 
the various impracticalities of such a vision of transportation to the Marquis Islands, it is 
interesting to note the ongoing comparison with British use of penal colonies and colonial 
prison islands which constituted the founding rationale for the French overseas penal colonies 
almost a century earlier (Brévié, 1937). Moreover, with the end of metropolitan 
transportation in sight, a reconfiguration takes place which shifts Poulo Condor from the 
periphery to the centre as, in Pagès’ reflections, it becomes the starting point for further future 
possibilities of transportation beyond Indochina and to the maintenance of a colonial penal 
project that places the remote prison island at its core.  
 
Conclusion: Carceral continuities 
 
The strategic importance of Con Dao is evident in the various colonial expeditions carried 
out during the 17th and 18th centuries as well as its complex etymology which suggests it 
also inspired the imagination of neighbouring territories including China and Malaysia. On 
15 March 1947, the French colonial newspaper Journal de Saïgon published its column “Les 
anniversaires oubliés” (forgotten anniversaries) with the subtitle “Un peu de géographie” (a little 
geography) dedicated to the history of France’s occupation of Poulo Condor: 
 
Situated in the South China Sea, opposite the western branch of the Mekong Delta, 
Poulo-Condore is formed of two small islands. The main, Grande Condor, measures 
15km by 9km with more than a thousand inhabitants. The climate is very hot and 
humid. The vegetation is abundant. One notices the penitentiary. Petite-Condor is 
separated from the larger island by a canal which dries up when the tide is out. 
Poulo-Condore was given to Louis XVI by the Emperor Gia-Long in 1787 and 
the penitentiary was closed. The island was occupied definitively by France in 1881. 
It was on 1st March 1862, just 85 years ago, that Poulo-Condore became a 
penitentiary once more and, since then, has housed criminals, thieves […] those 
condemned to forced labour. (Journal de Saïgon, 1947) 
 
The timing of this article which purports to be little more than a brief lesson in history 
and geography is no mere coincidence. Poulo Condor would have been very well known to 
both French and Indochinese subjects and so they did not need a reminder of its existence 
and location. What the article is reminding its readership of is France’s “right” to the island, 
as well as the longevity of its function as a prison island which pre-dates the arrival of the 
French. The article also contains a pointed reference to its population as being composed 
(with the implication that this has always been the case) of “criminals,” “thieves,” and “those 
condemned to forced labour”. The intention here is to remove all association of the 
penitentiary with political deportees whilst highlighting the strategic role of the island in 
colonial law enforcement. 
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Thus, where an article in Troupes Coloniales in 1938 (de Villepoix, 1938), emphasises 
the archipelago’s role beyond its function as a prison, what emerges in colonial discourse a 
decade later is a geopolitical understanding of the archipelago as indissociable from its role as 
colonial prison or bagne. Furthermore, the 1953 report undertaken as to the strategic value of 
the island dismisses the possibility of using it as a strategic military base due to the 
impracticalities of constructing a runway: 
On the whole, Poulo-Condore offers mediocre potential for the construction of a base. 
If defence is easy, the small surface area of the plains will entail enormous 
construction works in order to extend these towards the sea or to create installations 
sheltered by the rocks. 
Interior communication would be very difficult and require the construction of 
expensive roads due to the rocky terrain and steep slopes.  
The possibility of creating runways is limited and only a single runway could be 
built at substantial cost. (Commissariat Général de France en Indochine, 1953) 
 
Since this was later given priority by the U.S. administration, the dismissal of this possibility 
seems strange. While it might be explained by different budgets, military strategies, and 
technologies on the part of the French and the Americans, it also attests to the ongoing 
investment of French colonial occupation in Indochina in the Con Dao archipelago as penal 
colony. In this respect, the case of Poulo Condor constitutes an interesting and alternative 
example of what Manos (2015, p. 58) has called “prison fetishism”: “Unlike commodity 
fetishism, prison fetishism does not conceal an exploitative fracture at the heart of capitalism. 
Rather, it conceals the state and private industry’s rapid disinvestment in life itself.” 
If you visit Con Dao today, it is possible to take a tour of the different sites once 
belonging to the French colonial prison. One thing that immediately struck me is the extent 
to which these sites bear resemblance to the architecture and organisation of buildings used 
by the penal administration in French Guiana, where the majority of prisoners were housed 
in ‘blockhaus’ barracks: large empty rooms featuring stone banks, ever so slightly sloping. 
Prisoners were further confined via the use of the aforementioned barre de justice. 
Overcrowding meant that prisoners had difficulty lying flat and often had to take turns lying 
on their sides. Blockhauses of this type were used in the Camp de la Transportation in Saint-
Laurent-du-Maroni to house those convicts awaiting trial in the Tribunal Spécial Maritime for 
infractions such as attempted escape. As such, they constituted extra-judicial accommodation 
within the ‘quartier de reclusion’ – the prison inside the prison. Regular accommodation for 
convicts on work detail in and around Saint-Laurent took the form of barrack-like 
dormitories where convicts slept in hammocks. In Poulo Condor, however, it appears that 
accommodation in the blockhaus and the use of the barre de justice was default for prisoners 
regardless of their status.  
Another architectural comparison worth noting is the “tiger cages” found in both the 
Bagne des Annamites at Montsinéry (French Guiana) and on Con Dao. At the site at 
Montsinéry, the cells are not described as tiger cages and all that remains are the cell structures; 
the surrounding building and walkways which allowed guards to observe convicts from above 
have long vanished (Dedebant & Frémaux, 2012). While the site has been rendered accessible 
and is subject to regular clearing of vegetation, the presence of moss and foliage frames the 
cells as ruins of a bygone era. Conversely, on Con Dao, the cells, some of which had been 
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smashed up by the U.S. Army following the visit by Tom Harkin (then a legislative aide) and 
subsequent Life Magazine exposé (Harkin, 1970), have been reconstructed – complete with 
mannequins – and it is possible to enter the cells as well as view them from above. Here, the 
emphasis is on the relatively recent history of their usage. The construction of similar types 
of cell by the Americans in subsequent decades, now marked on tourist maps as “American 
Tiger Cages”, attests to a carceral continuity whereby the U.S. administration were able to 
vehemently critique the French use of various penal technologies as part of its colonial regime, 
yet unproblematically reproduce the same forms of incarceration in the service of its Cold 
War imperialism. 
The possibility of visiting these former sites of incarceration, torture, and execution 
might easily be located within a burgeoning tourist industry focused on the dark and macabre, 
aimed largely at the Western consumer in search of the sensational and transgressive. 
However, while acknowledging such forms of tourism are present on Con Dao, these sites 
have primarily been reclaimed within a nationalist ideology which celebrates the political 
education and organisation developed amongst prisoners while incarcerated on Poulo Condor 
as well as their resistance to forms of torture used by both the French and American 
occupations. Yet, it might be argued that a darker tourism exists in the development of the 
island as a luxury tourist resort, at once less accessible and more exclusive than the special 
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